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INTRODUCTION

There is considerable talk of failure in the air these days - including
constitutional failure, moral failure, political failure and institutional failure and criticisms of Congress figure prominently in this discourse. First, I shall
ask whether talk about Congress being "the broken branch," the topic of the
first panel in this symposium, is talk of constitutionalfailure or failure of some
other sort. Second, to link the topic of that panel to the topic of the panel in
which I participated, I will ask whether some call Congress the broken branch
because it is not adequately or appropriately democratic. More generally,
when people disparage Congress, are they doing so because they view it as
undemocratic? Or instead, because they view it as dysfunctional, ineffective,
irresponsible, and otherwise not up to the challenge of meeting the daunting
problems it will face in the twenty-first century?
Finally, I consider whether proposals that would make Congress more
defensibly democratic would likely mend or alleviate the supposed brokenness.
And, would making Congress more democratic lead people to disparage it
less? To preview my two arguments: first, I shall argue that talk about
Congress being "the broken branch" is not talk of constitutional failure but
instead talk of other sorts of failure; and second, I shall contend that making
Congress more democratic - from the standpoint of a normative political
theory of majoritarian democracy that is not embodied in the Constitution - is
not likely to heal its brokenness or to mitigate its disparagement.

* Professor of Law and The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law,
Boston University School of Law. I prepared this Essay for the conference on "The Most
Disparaged Branch: The Role of Congress in the 21st Century," Panel V, "Toward a More
Democratic Congress?" held at Boston University School of Law, November 14-15, 2008. I
am grateful to Sot Barber, Sandy Levinson, Steve Macedo, and Jeff Tulis for helpful
comments. In Part II of this Essay, I draw from my article, James E. Fleming, Successful
Failures of the American Constitution, in THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY

(Stephen Macedo & Jeffrey Tulis eds., forthcoming) (on file with author).
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DISCOURSE OF FAILURE IN THE AIR

What is constitutional failure?
Does it presuppose a conception of
constitutional success and of the preconditions for constitutional success?'
Whatever failure is, there is considerable talk of it in the air these days. Just
consider these titles from respected academics:
" Bruce Ackerman, The Failure of the Founding Fathers: Jefferson,
2
Marshall, andthe Rise of PresidentialDemocracy;

* Ronald Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?: Principlesfor a New
3
PoliticalDebate;

" Alan Wolfe, Does American Democracy Still Work?;4
" Thomas Mann & Norman Omstein, The Broken Branch: How
Congress Is FailingAmerica and How to Get It Back on Track,5 and

* Sanford Levinson,

Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the
6
Constitution Goes Wrong (and How We the People Can CorrectIt).

Consider also:
" John Dean, Broken Government: How Republican Rule Destroyed the
7
Legislative,Executive, and JudicialBranches;

* Larry Saboto, A More Perfect Constitution: 23 Proposals to Revitalize
8

Our ConstitutionandMake America a FairerCountry;

Sotirios Barber, Constitutional Failure: Ultimately Attitudinal, in THE LIMITS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (Stephen Macedo & Jeffrey Tulis eds., forthcoming) (on file

with author).
2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL,
AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2005).
3 RONALD DWORKIN, Is DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?: PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL
DEBATE (2006).
4 ALAN WOLFE, DOES AMERICAN DEMOCRACY STILL WORK? (2006).
5 THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: How CONGRESS IS
FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK (2006).
6 SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION
GOES WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
7 JOHN W. DEAN, BROKEN GOVERNMENT: How REPUBLICAN RULE DESTROYED THE
LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES (2007).
8 LARRY J. SABOTO, A MORE PERFECT CONSTITUTION: 23 PROPOSALS TO REVITALIZE OUR
CONSTITUTION AND MAKE AMERICA A FAIRER COUNTRY (2007).
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" Robert Kuttner, The Squandering of America: How the Failureof Our
Politics Undermines Our Prosperity;9 and
" Sheldon Wolin, Democracy Incorporated Managed Democracy and
0
the Specter ofInverted Totalitarianism.1
Before this recent spate of books, there was Mark Brandon's Free in the
World: American Slavery and ConstitutionalFailure.ll I should also mention
Will Harris's The InterpretableConstitutionand Sotirios Barber's On What the
Constitution Means, for both of these works - though they do not cry out
"failure" in their titles - prefigure the discussion of failure today. 12 Doubtless
there are other examples as well, but this list should serve to illustrate the range
of discourse about failure.
We should ask, are any of these authors really arguing that we are
experiencing a constitutional failure?
To be talking about distinctly
constitutional failure, surely one has to be talking about failures of the
Constitution, failures caused by the Constitution, failures stemming from a
feature or defect of the Constitution, or the like. The striking fact of the matter
is that, for all the ominous talk of failure, it is for the most part not talk of
constitutional failure in this sense. Instead, it is talk of other sorts of
shortcomings or failure: a moral failure (for example, in which a people prove
to lack the public reasonableness and religious moderation necessary for a
morally pluralistic constitutional democracy); 3 a political failure (for example,
the emergence of a new form of democratic politics that prompts analysts like
Alan Wolfe to ask whether American democracy still works); 14 an institutional
failure (for example, the developments leading to Thomas Mann & Norman
5
Ornstein's diagnosis of the institution of Congress as "the broken branch");
and a failure of policy (for example, a policy that has unintended bad
consequences or indeed makes a problem worse rather than helping to solve it).
Thus, it appears that the worrisome states of affairs diagnosed are not failures

9 ROBERT KUTTNER, THE SQUANDERING OF AMERICA: How THE FAILURE OF OUR POLITICS
UNDERMINES OUR PROSPERITY (2007).
10 SHELDON S. WOLIN, DEMOCRACY INCORPORATED: MANAGED DEMOCRACY AND THE
SPECTER OF INVERTED TOTALITARIANISM (2008).
11 MARK E. BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND CONSTITUTIONAL

FAILURE (1998).
12 SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS
HARRIS II, THE INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION (1993).
13 See, e.g., DwORKIN, supra note 3, at 52-55;

JAMES

E.

CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF AUTONOMY 226 (2006).
14 See WOLFE, supra note 4, at 22.

15See MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 6-11.

(1984); WILLIAM F.
FLEMING,

SECURING
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of the Constitution or failures directly attributable 16
to the Constitution (or to its
being inadequately or inappropriately democratic).
Let me illustrate my claim with a few observations about Sanford
Levinson's book, Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution
Goes Wrong (and How We the People Can Correct It).17 I think Levinson's

book is the closest thing we have in mainstream constitutional scholarship to
an argument that the American Constitution has failed or is in serious danger
of failing. Levinson, however, does not talk about actual failure, but about
serious defects, problematic dysfunction, and "hard-wired" features of our
18
structural Constitution that could contribute to a crisis, if not a failure.
Nowhere does he say our Constitution has failed. Indeed, much of his gripe
with the Constitution and our constitutional culture concerns the extent to
which we venerate the Constitution and view it as a success. Thus, he laments
how difficult it is to arouse people about the need for a constitutional
convention to make basic changes in the structural Constitution. 19 He is
frustrated that it is such a huge struggle to get people to see, as he puts it in his
subtitle, "where the Constitution goes wrong." It is even more difficult to
motivate them to press for a constitutional amendment, let alone a
constitutional convention, to correct it.
What exactly is Levinson's indictment of the American Constitution? He
argues that it is seriously undemocratic as measured by a normative theory of
democracy that is more majoritarian than the arrangements established in the
Constitution. His criticism also includes a number of empirical propositions in
support of the view that the constitutional order is dysfunctional, if not
broken.20 He fears that the undemocratic features of our structural Constitution
he criticizes may contribute to constitutional crises, and he tells us about a
number of crises that we have narrowly averted (including some about which
16

Of course, it could be the case that these types of failure, though not themselves

constitutional failure, are ultimately attributable to the Constitution in the sense that they are
made more likely by our constitutional design. This seems to be the suggestion of Sotirios
Barber's critique of James Madison's (and our Constitution's) eschewal of the Aristotelian
tradition of "supplying the defect of better motives" by inculcating moral and civic virtues
in favor of a strategy of private incentives and of letting ambition counteract ambition.
Barber, supra note 1 (manuscript at 6-9).
17 LEVINSON, supra note 6.
18 Id. at

22-24.
Id. at 167-80.
20 Levinson told me in an email that he had proposed to Oxford University Press the title
of Our Broken Constitution, but they declined because they had already used "broken" in
the title of the Mann & Ornstein book, The Broken Branch: How Congress Is Failing
America andHow to Get It Back on Track. See generally MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 5
(explaining the institutional decline of Congress and the increase in partisan polarization
within the branch). For what it is worth, I think it is a good thing that Oxford did not let
Levinson use that title, because it would not have fit his book as well as the title they agreed
upon.
19
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we did not even know). For example, in 1976, if only 5559 voters in Ohio and

3687 voters in Hawaii voted for Gerald Ford instead of Jimmy Carter, Ford
would have had 269 electoral votes compared to Carter's 268 and Reagan's 1,
and that would have sent the choice to the House of Representatives. 2
Levinson's analysis, focusing as it does on the "hard-wired" features of our
structural Constitution that have been in place since the beginning, could have
been written at most any time during the nation's history, and certainly any
time during the twentieth century.2 2 Granted, the presidential election
controversy culminating in Bush v. Gore,23 shifts in population resulting in the
disproportionate influence of small states in the Senate and the Electoral
College, and the emergence of the red states-blue states phenomenon (with
small red states having disproportionate influence in the Senate and
presidential elections) give the book a special urgency at the present time.
Nonetheless, even if George Bush had easily carried Florida in the 2000
presidential election and Al Gore had conceded defeat on election night,
Levinson still would have viewed the outcome as a travesty that demonstrates
one important place where the Constitution goes wrong. After all, Gore still
would have won the nationwide popular vote by a considerable margin and
still would have lost in the Electoral College, 271 to 266.24 And so, Levinson
still would have called for the abolition or reform of the Electoral College in
favor of direct popular vote and a requirement that,25to be elected, a presidential
candidate must win a majority of the popular vote.
Thus, Levinson's book is not simply a diagnosis of constitutional failure at
the present time. Instead, it is a descendant of writing during the progressive
era castigating the Constitution for being undemocratic and for not embodying
a form of democracy more like a British-style system of parliamentary
supremacy. Not surprisingly, he praises this progressive era literature and the
progressive movement for constitutional change. 26 Woodrow Wilson could
have written much of this book; indeed,27witness the quotation from Wilson
with which Levinson concludes his book.
In sum, Levinson does not so much argue that the Constitution has failed or
that Congress is broken. Instead, he asserts that the Constitution and Congress
are seriously imperfect from the critical standpoint of a normative political
theory of majoritarian democracy that is not embodied in the Constitution. He
supra note 6, at 94.
say that this analysis could have been written at any time during the twentieth
century because I recognize that some of the features of our practice that he criticizes, like
policy-based presidential vetoes and filibusters in the Senate, developed over time.
23 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000).
21 LEVINSON,
22 1

24

Richard L. Berke, Bush Prevails:By Single Vote, Justices End Recount, Blocking Gore

After 5-Week Struggle, NYTIMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at Al.
25 See LEVINSON, supra note 6, at 81-97.
26 Id. at 162-63.
27 Id. at 181.
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criticizes the conception of democracy - with all its limitations on majority
rule and one person, one vote - established by the Constitution. Thus, his book
is notably different from the other books about failure and congressional
brokenness in an important respect: they clearly are books for and about our
present predicament - for example, Wolfe's Does American Democracy Still
Work?, the title of which implies that it used to work but no longer does. 28
From Levinson's standpoint, the Constitution has always been indefensibly
undemocratic.
II.

UNDEMOCRATIC AND BROKENNESS

What is the relationship between charges that Congress is "the broken
branch" and criticisms that the Constitution in general and Congress in
particular are "undemocratic"?
Have undemocratic features of . our
Constitution and practice caused or contributed to the breakdown of Congress?
If so, how? Can we address or overcome breakdown by adopting proposals to
make Congress more democratic? And if so, through what measures?
I want to make as clear as possible that arguing Congress is the broken
branch and arguing it is undemocratic are not necessarily the same thing.
Congress could be broken for reasons that have nothing to do with being
undemocratic (from the standpoint of a normative political theory of
majoritarian democracy). And we could object to the undemocratic nature of
Congress even if it were functioning quite well. Indeed, I have suggested that
much of Levinson's indictment of our Constitution and our Congress for being
undemocratic would apply at any point in our nation's history irrespective of
29
how well or poorly our institutions are functioning.
For example, Levinson views the equal representation of states in the Senate
as illegitimate from the beginning. This criticism applies even in the moments
when the Senate has lived up to its self-image as the world's greatest
deliberative body, and not just in the moments when senators from less
populous states (like former Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska) were able to bring
the bacon home to their citizens disproportionately when compared with
senators from more populous states (like California). 30 Similarly, his critique
of bicameralism would apply at any time in our nation's history, 31 even at the
moment when the less democratic but more responsible Senate passed the
October 2008 financial bailout bill after it had been rejected by the more
32
democratic (but, need I say, less responsible) House.
What is more, I would suggest that adopting proposals to make Congress
more democratic would not likely mend the branch's brokenness. For
example, abolishing the Senate in order to create a unicameral system would
28 See WOLFE, supra note 4.
29

See supra text accompanying notes 22-27.
supra note 6, at 25-27, 49-62.

30 LEVINSON,

31Id. at 29-38.
32 See David M. Herszenhom, Bush Signs Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at Al.
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not do so. 33 Nor would reallocating Senate seats or increasing the total number
of such seats, which Larry Sabato proposes and Levinson supports. 34 Nor for
that matter would getting rid of the presidential policy-based veto, which
Levinson proposes. 35 Granted, adopting such measures would make the
Congress and the Constitution better fit a normative political theory of
majoritarian democracy, but doing that and mending the brokenness of
Congress are not the same thing.
Let us look briefly at one of Levinson's favorite punching bags, the equal
representation of states in the Senate. His complaint is that this arrangement
violates the principle of equal participation or one person, one vote. 36 I have
heard Levinson say that in recent years he feels more and more like a political
scientist as distinguished from a law professor. 37 But, I submit that
preoccupation with the equal representation of states in the Senate as being an
undemocratic pox on the face of the Constitution or indeed a "constitutional
stupidity" 38 is a preoccupation peculiar to law professors. Law professors have
read and teach Reynolds v. Sims, 3 9 and they want to bring its principle of one
person, one vote from reapportionment of the House over to reconstitution of
the Senate. Political scientists, by contrast, tend to begin with the study of how
40
the Senate actually works.
If the Senate is a failure or a stupidity for its failure to conform to the
principle of one person, one vote, I would say it is a successful failure of the
33Levinson mentions a resolution to abolish the Senate. See LEVINSON, supra note 6, at
162. He is also deeply critical of "our illegitimate Senate" and the assumption that
bicameralism is the natural division of legislatures despite the fact that "two-thirds of the
countries around the world have only one-house legislatures." Id. at 30-31, 49-62.
34 SABATO, supra note 8, at 23-28; see Sanford Levinson, Still Complacent After All
These Years: Some Rumination on the ContinuingNeed for a "New PoliticalScience" (Not
to Mention a New Way of Teaching Law Students About What Is Truly Most Important
About the Constitution), 89 B.U. L. REV. 409, 418-19 (2009).
35 LEVrNSON, supra note 6, at 38-49.
36 Id. at 49-62.
37 Levinson, supra note 34, at 409.
3sLEVINSON, supra note 6, at 58 (referring to articles by Yale law professor William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The One Senator, One Vote Clauses, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES,
CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 35, 35-39 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds.,
1998), and Vanderbilt law professor Suzanna Sherry, Our Unconstitutional Senate, in
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES, supra, at 95, 95-97).
19377 U.S. 533, 561-68 (1964).
40 See generally David R. Mayhew, Is Congress "the Broken Branch"?,89 B.U. L. REV.
357 (2009) (arguing that there is no compelling case for revising the Constitution); Kenneth
A. Shepsle, Dysfunctional Congress?, 89 B.U. L. REV. 371 (2009) (responding to Levinson
and arguing that our unhappiness with Congress stems from an unhappiness with institutions
generally); Barbara Sinclair, Question: What's Wrong with Congress? Answer: It's a
Democratic Legislature, 89 B.U. L. REV. 387 (2009) (arguing that Congress may appear
dysfunctional and ineffective because what we ask it to do is "really, really hard").

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 89:629

American Constitution. 4 1 How so? Accepting James Madison's arguments in
The Federalist Papers for the virtues of an extended republic over a small
republic as a structure for controlling the effects of factions over and against
the common good,42 the Senate represents more extended republics - i.e.,

states - than do the districts of the House of Representatives. Additionally,
senators, representing these more extended republics, have a relatively greater
capacity to deliberate about the common good, not only statewide but also
nationwide.

43

Furthermore, while many decry the influence of money in politics, not to
mention the increasingly national flow of money in senatorial campaigns, one
benefit may be that senatorial candidates have to take more national
perspectives and show a commitment to the nation's common good. Speaking
for myself, as a resident of Massachusetts, I contributed no money to the
senatorial candidates in Massachusetts, though I enthusiastically voted for one
of them. However, I did contribute money to senatorial candidates in states
like New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Minnesota.
Finally, the greater national visibility of the Senate makes it a more fertile
breeding ground for presidential candidates than the House. 44 This, too, fosters
a broader view and greater likelihood of senators taking positions for the
national common good, not just for the good of, say, Illinois or Arizona.
Granted, sometimes this is nothing more than position-taking (this is
something I learned long ago from David Mayhew's famous and influential
book, Congress: The Electoral Connection).45 Nevertheless, if we put aside
the fact that the composition of the Senate violates the principle of one person,
one vote, we can see that it functions as a more extended republic, with greater
capacity for deliberation about the common good, and greater capacity for
responsible democratic government, than the House. It may not be perfect
James E. Fleming, Successful Failures of the American Constitution, in THE LIMITS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 1 (manuscript at 19-22, on file with author).
42 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
43 It is not for nothing that the Senate conceives itself as the world's greatest deliberative
body - and sometimes it even acts like it!
44 Consider the presidential candidates from the last ten presidential elections: nine had
been governors (George W. Bush (2004 & 2000), Bill Clinton (1996 & 1992), Michael
Dukakis (1988), Ronald Reagan (1984 & 1980), and Jimmy Carter (1980 & 1976)); eight
had been senators (Barack Obama (2008), John McCain (2008), John Kerry (2004), Al Gore
(2000, more recently Vice President), Bob Dole (1996), Walter Mondale (1984, more
recently Vice President), Richard Nixon (1972, more recently Vice President), and George
McGovern (1972)); only one had been in the House of Representatives (Gerald Ford (1976,
more recently Vice President)); and two had never been elected to national office before
becoming the Vice President (George H.W. Bush (1988 & 1992)).
41

45 DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 61-73 (1974)

("The

third activity congressmen engage in may be called position taking, defined here as the
public enunciation of a judgmental statement on anything likely to be of interest to political
actors.").
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from the standpoint of a normative political theory of majoritarian democracy,
but it may work well enough.
III.

PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING CONGRESS

We could distinguish at least three types of proposals for improving
Congress: some might focus on making Congress more effective; others might
aspire to make it more democratic; and a third group might attempt to make it
more responsible. Three panel topics from the symposium allude to these three
types of criticisms and proposals. Panel I, "Is Congress 'the Broken Branch'?"
raises the first issue of how to mend Congress's brokenness by making it more
effective and less dysfunctional. The panel in which I presented, "Toward a
More Democratic Congress?" invites analysis of how to make Congress more
democratic and whether doing so would mend its brokenness. Panel VI,
"Toward a More Responsible Congress?," considers how irresponsibility
contributes to Congress's brokenness and how increasing Congress's
responsibility might make it less broken.
Let us distinguish two types of reforms that might make Congress more
The first type consists of altering or abolishing present
democratic.
arrangements by constitutional amendment - such as the equal representation
of states in the Senate, the practice of the filibuster, and the policy-based
presidential veto. This would include proposals like Sabato's idea of having
by
former Presidents serve as national senators, as well as his idea, endorsed
46
Levinson, of expanding the number of seats in the Senate (and the House).
The second type of reform consists of enacting significant statutes that aim
to curb present abuses. To invoke Bruce Ackerman's recent analysis in
American Prospect, we might undergo "great repudiations" every thirty years
or so. 4 7 Thus, just as we repudiated the excesses of the Nixon presidency by
the War Powers Resolution, the Federal Election Campaign Act, and the
Independent Counsel Act, 48 so we might repudiate present excesses through
what Mark Tushnet has called "good-government reforms. '49 At the present
time, though, it seems that any significant good government statutes along

these lines would be adopted in response to the excesses of the Bush
presidency. Any breakdowns or failures of Congress will be low priority for

the foreseeable future.

46

Just recall the failure of John McCain to get any

SABATO, supra note 8, at 23-32; see LEVINSON, supra note 6, at 8-9.

47 Bruce Ackerman & Gerard Magliocca, The Great Repudiator?, AM. PROSPECT, Nov.
5, 2008, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article--thegreat-repudiator.
48 ANDREW RUDALEVIGE, THE NEW IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: RENEWING PRESIDENTIAL
POWER AFTER WATERGATE 5-7 (2005).
41 Mark Tushnet, Some Notes on CongressionalCapacity to Interpret the Constitution,

89 B.U. L. REV. 499, 508 (2009).
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traction on or arouse any
furor over the practice of earmarks during his 2008
50
presidential campaign.
One of the striking, yet not surprising, things about most of the proposals for
constitutional amendments made by Levinson and Sabato is that they aim to
make Congress more democratic by diluting the disproportionate power of
small states and minority political parties. I will make two points about this.
First, small states and minority political parties may have sufficient power to
block any proposed constitutional amendments of this sort. Not only would
they vote against constitutional amendments whereby they would relinquish
their disproportionate power, but also, they would not suffer gladly the debate
surrounding the proposed amendments with the opposition contending that
they presently enjoy unjustified (and unjustifiable) disproportionate power.
Minority political parties can block at the proposal stage. It requires only one
third of one house of Congress to defeat a proposal for a constitutional
amendment. And small states can block
at the ratification stage - it requires
51
only one quarter of the states to do so.
Second, we should reflect upon the circumstances in which we have
successfully amended the Constitution to make it more democratic. Consider,
for example, the adoption of the Twenty-second Amendment limiting the
president to two terms. 52 One might see this amendment as making our
Constitution more democratic (although, of course, one might also see it as
making the Constitution less democratic, by denying the people the power to
elect whom they choose). We could imagine that in 1950, when the
amendment was ratified, cynics might think that Democratic representatives
and senators who had been strong supporters of FDR would oppose the
amendment on the ground that it was an implicit criticism of him for having
the audacity (and popularity) to run four times. Republican supporters of the
amendment who hated FDR surely viewed the proposed Twenty-second
Amendment as a rebuke to him. Yet the Congress did propose the amendment
and the states did ratify it, despite the fact that Democrats controlled both
houses of Congress, and FDR had won at least three quarters of the states in
53
1944 as in all three prior elections.
10 Of course, we also might distinguish between institutional design writ large - like that
in Levinson's and Sabato's books - and institutional design writ small - as in Adrian
Vermeule's book. Compare LEVINSON, supra note 6, at 168-80, and SABATO, supra note 8,
at 221-32, with ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
WRIT SMALL 2 (2007) ("In established constitutional polities, I argue, law can and should and to some extent already does - provide mechanisms of democracy: a repertoire of smallscale institutional devices and innovations that promote democratic values against the
background of standard large-scale institutions.").
51 U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring a vote of two thirds of both houses of Congress to
propose a constitutional amendment and support from three quarters of the states to ratify
it).
52 Id. at amend. XXII, § 1.
53 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION:

A

BIOGRAPHY

433-38 (2005).
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Consider, by contrast, the fate of proposals to alter or abolish the Electoral
College, after the presidential election controversy culminating in Bush v.
Gore.54 These proposals went nowhere, in part because Republicans would
never support them, not only because such proposals would deny them their
disproportionate power in the Electoral College (through their relatively
greater success in small states), but also because they weie not about to do
anything implying that George Bush had illegitimately, unfairly or
55
undemocratically gained office.
These two examples prompt us to ask, in what circumstances is Congress
able to ascend to a high enough level of public-spiritedness to enable it to
propose amendments that would make the Constitution more democratic? This
is a subject worthy of further study that I cannot pursue fully here.56 One
57
would have to examine amendments like the Seventeenth Amendment,
59
Nineteenth Amendment, 58 Twenty-fourth Amendment, and Twenty-sixth
Amendment, 60 all of which in one way or another can be said to have made the
Constitution more democratic.
Part of the answer surely has to do with social movements and with the
political events of the day. It is hard to imagine the call for abolishing the
Senate or limiting the policy-based presidential veto as generating social
movement-driven constitutional amendments or even as inspiring good
government statutes.
Furthermore, I suppose that Levinson's proposals are self-defeating in a
certain sense. 61 For the very circumstances that give rise to the proposals - the
undemocratic character of Congress or the Constitution - practically insure
that the proposals will not be adopted. After all, would a Congress that is as
54 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000).

55 For a discussion of proposals to abolish the Electoral College in the aftermath of the
2000 presidential election, see David Stout, The 43rd President: The Electoral College,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 19, 2000, at A31.
56 For fuller analysis of the circumstances in which the Constitution has been amended,
see, for example, AMAR, supra note 53, at 313-463.
51 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (creating the direct election of senators and ratified in the
context of the progressive movement).
58 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (giving women the right to vote and ratified in the context of
the women's suffrage movement).
59 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § I (abolishing the poll tax and ratified in the context of
the civil rights movement).
60 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (giving eighteen-year-olds the right to vote and ratified
in the context of the Vietnam War, which in effect says "if you're old enough to die for your
country in the Vietnam War, you're old enough to vote").
61 This is the kind of argument I would expect my co-panelist Adrian Vermeule to make.
See Adrian Vermeule, Self-Defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers, 75

FORDHAM L. REv. 631, 631 (2006) ("Proposals defeat themselves when the motives, beliefs,
or political opportunities ascribed to relevant actors by the theorist's diagnosis are
incompatible with the solution that the theorist offers.").
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undemocratic (and dysfunctional) as Levinson says it is propose the
amendments that he believes would be necessary to make it more democratic?
The answer is likely no. Indeed, Levinson recognizes this. That is one reason
why he calls for a constitutional convention, and not merely amendments to the
existing Constitution. 62 He 63also blames the "iron cage" of Article V's onerous
procedures for amendment.
Perhaps his call for a constitutional convention is itself a self-defeating
proposal. For one thing, there is no guarantee that the constitutional
convention he hopes for would adopt more democratic arrangements than we
currently have. For another, if the dysfunction of Congress (and the electorate)
is ultimately attitudinal, as Sotirios Barber has argued, 64 perhaps the attitudes
that the delegates would bring to the convention would lead it to propose
arrangements that are less democratic (and otherwise worse) than arrangements
under the existing Constitution.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, a Congress described as broken is not likely to propose
constitutional amendments or even significant legislation to make itself more
democratic. In any event, attempts to make Congress more democratic would
not likely mend its supposed brokenness.

62 LEVINSON,
63

supra note 6, at 167-80.

Id. at 160.

64 Barber, supra note 1 (manuscript at 2).

